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Abstract—A promising approach for designing critical embed-
ded systems is based on virtualization technologies and multi-
core platforms. These enable the deployment of both real-time
and general-purpose systems with different criticalities in a
single host. Integrating virtualization while also meeting the
real-time and isolation requirements is non-trivial, and poses
significant challenges especially in terms of certification. In
recent years, researchers proposed hardware-assisted solutions
to face issues coming from virtualization, and recently the use
of Operating System (OS) virtualization as a more lightweight
approach. Industries are hampered in leveraging this latter type
of virtualization despite the clear benefits it introduces, such as
reduced overhead, higher scalability, and effortless certification
since there is still lack of approaches to address drawbacks. In
this position paper, we propose the usage of Intel’s CPU security
extension, namely SGX, to enable the adoption of enclaves based
on unikernel, a flavor of OS-level virtualization, in the context of
real-time systems. We present the advantages of leveraging both
the SGX isolation and the unikernel features in order to meet
the requirements of safety-critical real-time systems and ease the
certification process.
Index Terms—Real-time, Intel SGX, Unikernel, Virtualization
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Critical Real-Time Embedded Systems
(CRTES) are shifting towards an integrated paradigm, in
which multiple applications share the same physical platform
resources [1]. Such an approach allows running applications
with different level of criticality on the same embedded
platform. The enabling technologies have been multi-core
processors and virtualization. The former enhances perfor-
mance by reducing the overall costs, size, weight, and energy
consumption [2]. While the latter is typically adopted to create
separate domains of CRTES tasks. Despite promises given by
these technologies, there are several drawbacks to be addressed
[3]. More precisely, the temporal, spatial, fault, and I/O
isolations between virtual domains are at risk in hypervisors’
hands. Additionally, the design of CRTESs is still bounded
to a rigorous certification process, in which developers must
provide evidence about a huge amount of software and its
level of partitioning, showing documented proofs about, e.g.,
fault containment between a virtual domain to another, absence
of temporal interferences between critical and non-critical
functions. In order to increase the isolation of virtual domains,
the research community explored the possibility of leveraging
hardware-assisted solutions. The most explored approach has
been to use security features provided by ARM, i.e., the ARM
TrustZone technology [4], indeed enabling a more powerful
form of isolation assisted by the hardware. ARM TrustZone,
in fact, supports a so-called “dual world” execution [5]–[15].
Usually, the non-secure world is used as an environment for
running VMs, which are managed by the hypervisor software
that runs in the secure world. Researchers used the TrustZone
dual-guest configuration for running a general-purpose OS
(GPOS) within the non-secure world, while a real-time OS
(RTOS) runs in the secure-world having a full view of the
entire system. In this way, the critical tasks running on top of
the RTOS are isolated by non-critical tasks.
Another emerging trend in real-time applications is exploiting
OS-level virtualization (also named container-based virtual-
ization) [16], which —unlike fully emulating a hardware
machine— it abstracts OS processes (called containers) by
extending the (host) OS kernel. The main reason behind the
usage of containers in real-time domains [17]–[20] is to reduce
the overhead affecting VMs and better scale when a larger
number of applications of different criticalities are in place.
Indeed, the container approach does not require to replicate
the entire OS environment for every system. However, the
performance benefits introduced by containers come at the
cost of reduced isolation, threatening the practicability of OS-
level virtualization under real-time and safety requirements.
In the context of OS-level virtualization, the sole approach
to somehow face isolation issues may be to run a single
application in its virtual domain. Such model is known as
unikernel or library OSes [21], in which the full software stack
of a system, including OS components, libraries, language
runtime, and applications, is compiled into a single VM that
runs directly on a general-purpose hypervisor. This approach
introduces benefits such a small code base, low attack surface,
and an effortless certification process due to the low amount
of software to be verified [21]. However, stronger isolation
proofs to be reported to certifiers are still lacking.
In this position paper, we propose a hardware-assisted
solution for leveraging OS virtualization in the field of CRTES.
In particular, we discuss the potential adoption of the well
established Intel Software Guard eXtension (SGX) extension
[22] to enable powerful isolation when OS-level virtualiza-
tion is pursued in CRTES applications having certification
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requirements. The SGX is the technological implementation of
hardware-assisted trusted execution, as conceived from Intel.
SGX belongs to the same category of ARM TrustZone since
its Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is internal to the
CPU perimeter. Intel SGX provides capabilities for securing
user space applications without the need of calling privileged
OS code. Basically, SGX provides tools for creating memory
areas called enclaves, which protect application code and data
from accesses by other software, including higher-privileged
software. Memory pages which are within an enclave can
not be accessed by code outside of the enclave. The pro-
posed approach is intended for executing an RTOS based on
unikernels into an SGX enclave. Besides the advantages for
CRTES, unikernels represent also one of the best ways to
bypass the impossibility of issuing syscalls (normally executed
at ring0) from within an enclave that only supports ring3
functions [23]–[26]. Unfortunately, nowadays, the availability
of unikernel-based RTOSes are still poor. MirageOS [27] is
the sole example. Finally, we examine the impact that such
an approach could entail during the certification process, by
focusing on the isolation properties that must be fulfilled.
II. OS-LEVEL VIRTUALIZATION IN REAL-TIME DOMAIN
Virtualization technologies are the core enabler of sev-
eral computer engineering applications, ranging from cloud
computing to real-time embedded systems. In contrast to
cloud computing, in CRTES development there is a need for
specific mechanisms that guarantee and enforce the execution
of applications to meet timing and safety requirements [3]. In
years, several techniques were developed to abstract physical
resources in virtual, from the classical full-virtualization and
para-virtualization, to more recent OS-level virtualization [28],
[29].
OS-level virtualization, allows running multiple appliances
without hardware virtualization. The idea behind container-
based virtualization is to enhance the abstractions of OS
processes (called containers), by extending the (host) OS
kernel, in order to have a virtual domain with its own virtual
CPU and virtual memory like in traditional OS processes,
a virtual filesystem, virtual network, IPCs, PIDs, and users
management. These virtual resources are distinct for each
container in the system. Currently, the most used container-
based virtualization technologies are LXC [30], Docker [31],
and OpenVZ [32].
As mentioned before, virtualization has to address the
critical problem of guarantee the isolation among virtual
instances [33]–[35]. In the more general sense, isolation means
the fact that something is independent and disentangled to
the behaviors of other things. Thus, the virtualization layer
has to be in complete control of virtualized resources, and
applications running on a virtual domain must have the illusion
to be completely isolated from others. In general, in the vir-
tualization context, we consider two main isolation properties
that are mandatory.
The temporal isolation (also known as performance isola-
tion or temporal segregation), is the capability of isolating
or limiting the impact of resource consumption (e.g., CPU,
network, disk) of a virtual domain on the performance degra-
dation of the other virtual domains, but also against the host.
This means that a critical task running on a virtual domain
(e.g., task on a VM or within a container) must not cause
severe delays of other critical and non-critical tasks, leading
to a phenomenon like starvation, reduction of throughput, and
increased latency. Temporal isolation is crucial in embedded
systems when critical tasks within containers need to assure
SLA guarantees about performance. In the context of safety-
critical applications, some standards (e.g., IEC 61508-3 Annex
F [36], ISO 26262-6 Annex-D [37], ARINC-653 [38], DO
178 6.3.3f [39], CAST-32A [40]) suggest to exploit a cyclic
scheduling among virtual domains.
The other crucial isolation property is the spatial isolation
(also known as memory isolation or spatial separation). Such
property describes the capability of isolating code and data
between virtual domains, and between virtual domains and
the host kernel. This means that a task should not be able
to alter private data belonging to other tasks, including the
devices allocated to a specific task. Break spatial isolation
will likely lead to unexpected behaviors or worse a system
crash [41]. Usually, spatial isolation is enforced by hardware
memory protection like Memory Management Unit (MMU),
which protects the task’s virtual memory space. Furthermore,
by considering the case of shared devices, we need to focus
also on the I/O isolation property. Often, the IOMMU is
exploited to properly address the isolation of memory-mapped
devices, and in some cases, the access on hardware devices
from a different virtual domain is serialized.
Finally, another kind of isolation property that must be
addressed is fault isolation (also known as fault/error contain-
ment). Fault isolation means that potential faults that occur
in one virtual domain should not be propagated towards
hypervisor and/or other partitions, leading to hangs or even
halting the entire system.
Bearing in mind the needs of a virtualization approach
that is both lightweight and provide the isolation properties
mentioned above, unikernels are recently gaining a significant
attention [42]. The unikernel is an approach of linking an ap-
plication with OS components. In particular, such components
include the core services of a kernel like memory management,
scheduler, network and disk stack, and device drivers. Thus,
the application and the kernel have a unique address space,
creating a standalone binary image that is bootable directly
on physical and/or virtual hardware [43]. The big advantage
that unikernels provide is that the kernel functionalities can be
specialized to fit the needs of the target application. For exam-
ple, the developer would want to increase a specific aspect of
performance of its application (e.g., the network throughput) or
to improve isolation. Since unikernel is a lightweight solution
for virtualization, it could be a promising solution to be
adopted in the context of safety-critical embedded systems,
where the needs of having a well-defined software component
would facilitate the certification process. Another example of
the potential of unikernel in the embedded systems is the
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predictability. Indeed, since moment by moment, only one
task/process is running on the unikernel, we can say with
good confidence that if an operation is completed in a specific
amount of time, it will take the same amount of time every
time will be executed. If we compare such behavior against
the Linux kernel, for example, there are various factors of
unpredictability, like page faults, internal locks, scheduling
jitter, and so on. Thus, unikernels would be also a promising
solution for the measurement of the worst-case execution time
(WCET), which is mandatory and usually is a non-trivial task
both in single- and multi-core platforms. Naturally, we need
to consider that the predictability of unikernels is valid in
the real-time domain as long as the underlying hypervisor
schedules the task to the CPU always in the same way. Thus,
we need to take into account the possibility of using real-time
hypervisors for solving the problem of determinism.
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Fig. 1. Virtualization deployments.
Fig. 1 summarizes potential virtualization approaches that
could be used in the development of CRTES, from the classical
hypervisor-based, passing through the container-based to the
unikernel model.
III. ENHANCING ISOLATION VIA INTEL SGX
Leveraging OS virtualization for CRTES is non-trivial as
the confinement of containers’ domains is more difficult to
enforce and demonstrate, due to the weak isolation that LXC
namespace and cgroup create [44]. In this sense, a unikernel
could represent a solution. Its properties of an extra lightweight
OS can certainly facilitate the certification process in terms of
software verification. However, unikernels are still subjected
to isolation problems that could lead to interferences among
critical tasks of CRTES. In this paper, we propose the adoption
of Intel SGX-enabled unikernels in the context of CRTES to
provide guarantees on the isolation for real-time tasks running
in dedicated domains. In fact, the hardware-assisted security
isolation features of Intel SGX can be leveraged to this end
as other researchers similarly did with ARM TrustZone to
segregate VM domains [5]–[15].
SGX is a security technology that is catching on in both
research and industrial communities. It is a set of new
hardware instructions that isolate sensitive code and data
processing, even from users with root privileges. SGX enables
a confined region of execution, namely secure enclave, whose
access is supervised by the hardware that enforces isolation
of processes. The SGX threat model assumes that most of
the host stack is untrusted. Thus, the CPU ensures that the
enclave memory is not accessible by any part of the system,
except for the code running inside the enclave itself. For the
purpose of this paper, it is important to notice that there are
two main drawbacks of SGX to be taken into account. That
is, i) the physical memory size dedicated to all the instantiated
enclaves is limited to 128MB, ii) the execution of syscalls is
forbidden in the enclave as the OS is considered untrusted.
Currently, there are solutions where SGX was used to enhance
the security of unmodified applications basically by running
them in SGX-secured domains [23]–[26]. These studies pur-
sued two different approaches for providing syscall support to
the application into an enclave [45]. In particular, in a first
case Arnautov et al. [23] use an SGX-extended libc library to
expose an external (and optimized) syscall interface, which is
SGX-shielded. In a second case [24]–[26], researchers lever-
age the single-address space property of unikernels (i.e., Linux-
Kernel-Library, Graphene, and Drawbridge, respectively) to
execute syscalls directly inside the SGX enclave. Essentially,
the latter category of studies port an entire unikernel into an
enclave to provide lightweight OS support to the application.
Contrariwise, Sfyrakis et al. [46] propose the adoption of SGX
to secure only some computations of a MirageOS unikernel
[27].
In this position paper, we lay the foundations for a solution
where unikernels —of different or same typology— run tasks
of distinct criticality in SGX enclaves. Figure 2 shows a
possible architecture of our proposal.
Native Linux OS
SGX Enclave
KVM-SGX
Unikernel
Non-
Critical 
Task
Critical 
Task 1
SGX Enclave
Unikernel
Critical 
Task 2
Hardware SGX-Enabled
Fig. 2. Architecture of CRTES based on Intel SGX
The proposed approach is intended for only running critical
tasks in SGX and the non-critical in the “normal” world.
Another approach would have been to launch all the tasks in
as many enclaves. However, unlike solutions based on ARM
TrustZone, we need to take into account the memory limitation
imposed by SGX technology, i.e., 128MB, which is shared by
all the enclaves. Hence, we believe that one enclave per critical
task is the only feasible approach. Even in this case, launching
too many critical tasks could entail that the memory bounds
would be exceeded. A more accurate number highly depends
on the unikernel solution adopted. For example, IncludeOS
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is a unikernel with one of the lowest memory footprint (i.e.,
≈ 10MB). Currently, unikernels footprints are approximately
of 8MB on average [47]. This means that we could have a
number of about 16 running critical tasks, which are in many
cases above the real need for a CRTES.
Moreover, the adoption of SGX for CRTES can not disre-
gard an analysis on the isolation properties. The spatial and
temporal isolation are essentially ensured by SGX. The CPU
realizes architectural isolation by monitoring the accesses to
enclave-owned physical memory pages. The mechanism of
enclave isolation is mainly provided through the Enclave Page
Cache Map (EPCM). The EPCM is the table where the SGX
processor checks the correctness of the system software’s
allocation decisions, and refuse to perform any action that
would compromise SGX isolation. An EPCM entry identifies
the enclave that owns the Enclave Page Cache (EPC) page,
that is, the enclaves’ content and the related data structures
information. Since the EPCM identifies one specific owning
enclave for each EPC page, enclaves can not communicate
via shared memory using EPC pages. Enclaves only share
untrusted non-EPC memory. SGX also prevents attempts from
the Direct Memory Access (DMA) devices to get access to the
enclave. This is of importance as current memory isolation
techniques for CRTES are usually based on the MMU, which
prevents applications running in one partition to read/write into
address space allocated to other partitions. However, such an
isolation as-is is threatened by the DMA that could bypass the
checking procedure of the MMU. In a nutshell, the isolation
may be put at risk when, e.g., the unikernel running in the
enclave needs support from the external world or needs to
communicate with another critical task executing in another
enclave. In fact, there are some unikernel syscalls that must
necessarily demand to the external OS. The implemented
solution of an SGX-enabled CRTES should take into account
the previous considerations. Solving mechanisms might be
designed and developed to face the isolation of tasks and
provide further guarantees in the certification phase.
IV. CERTIFICATION IMPLICATIONS
Regardless of the specific domain, the developing of safety-
critical applications in industries raises several concerns from
the certification point of view. In order to reach a specific
level of safety, indicated as Safety Integrity Level (SIL) (but
depending on the standards, SIL appears also as Automotive
Safety Integrity Level (ASIL), Software Safety Integrity Level
(SSIL), Design Assurance Level (DAL)), standards require
performing burdensome tasks that include verification, per-
formance testing, impact analysis, use of coding standards,
on both the hardware and software components within the
developed systems. Notwithstanding the cost and effort of
certifying CRTES increases significantly with the SIL level,
the problem is more exacerbated due to the integration of
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software in
the products. In general, compared to the bare-metal solutions,
the use of virtualization brings additional software layers
and components in the overall architecture, and this lead to
further complicate the certification. Thus, providing evidence
for isolation properties is far from to be effortless.
Considering the hardware and software stacks in the devel-
opment process, we need to address the different level of safety
required by the certification process, which lead to analyze
isolation properties at different layers. For example, according
to the EN 50128 standard that provides guidelines for the
certification of the software employed in the railway domain
[48], [49], focusing on the temporal and spatial isolation
guarantees, the requirements D.45 Response Timing and
Memory Constraints specifies that is needed an analysis
aimed to estimate the resource usage and the latency for each
system functionalities, which include all software modules
(from the hypervisor to the kernel).
The strategy for developing CRTES based on virtualization
and multi-core platform should be based on the guidelines
provided by standards. The safety standards impose a precise
development process (e.g., the IEC 61508 recommends using
the V-model development process for designing safety-related
software and hardware [36]), where we need to comply with
further steps and requirements for covering safety and certifi-
cation needs. Normally, such process should be based on the
management of systems hazards, meaning that such hazards
are eliminated or at least mitigated enough up to tolerable
rates for the safety levels assigned to the identified safety
functions. A potential approach for identifying the possible
threats to safety is an analysis of the failure modes. For
example, according to our proposal, we could apply the Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), and try to identify the
potential causes of failures by introducing disturbances (e.g.,
faults, anomalous loads) at the different levels of the CRTES
software stack. Actually, many studies in literature [50]–[55]
and various international standards for software reliability and
safety [37], [39], [48], [56], [57] exploit the injection of
faults in complex systems in order to assess their behavior
and unveil potential bottlenecks and critical components un-
der these abnormal inputs and conditions. Furthermore, fault
injection technique is often used to measure the efficiency
(e.g., coverage, latency, etc.) of fault tolerance mechanisms,
including fault detection and recovery. For example, in the EN
50128 document is clearly stated that for the maximum level
of safety (i.e., SIL 4) is highly recommended using Software
Error Effect Analysis (SEEA) for identifying the criticality of
each software component and improve the overall robustness
of the software.
In combination with our proposal, there is a clear need for
developing systematic approaches for testing the degree of
isolation required by certification. In particular, by leveraging
fault injection technique, an approach would be identifying
and enumerating all the interfaces and resources involved at
different levels of the CRTES software stack (e.g., hypervisor-
and unikernel-level), to find suitable locations for injecting
faults. Furthermore, it would be necessary defining measures
of spatial and temporal isolation that could point out isolation
issues; for example, a developer could use the existing per-
formance isolation metrics [58], or adapt other metrics in the
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context of isolation [59].
Independently from the above considerations, it is important
to underline that safety standards do not oblige developers or
practitioners to use some particular measure or procedure for
evaluating the fault tolerance, because they are not meant for
exactly this or that target system. Instead, they suggest general
guidelines that apply to a more wide family of systems.
V. CONCLUSION
In this position paper, we have discussed the adoption of
both the Intel SGX hardware extension and the unikernel
lightweight virtualization in the context of safety-critical real-
time embedded systems. Our proposed idea is to leverage the
isolation properties provided by SGX —typically used for
security reasons in untrusted systems— in order to provide
temporal and spatial isolation guarantees for critical tasks
executing in the trusted execution environment of SGX. Po-
tentially, our work could introduce the following advantages
to CRTES:
i) the isolation among critical tasks is stronger thanks to the
boundaries checks enforced by SGX hardware;
ii) the reliability increases as the risk of faults (e.g., memory
leak) with unikernel is much more reduced, which is
crucial for safety-related systems;
iii) the performance is higher as the unikernel model indeed
offers performance improvements;
iv) the software certification process is facilitated thanks to
unikernels’ lightweight properties.
We want to remark that a fundamental requirement is the
availability of the SGX hardware. Currently, the ARM archi-
tecture is widely used as 32b/64b RISC multi-core processors
in embedded systems. However, we are witnessing the trend
in the real-time embedded world of adopting virtualization to
support multi-purpose OSes. In this regard, the most compre-
hensive virtualization support comes from Intel’s architecture.
Hence, the future usage of these CPUs is very likely, as
witnessed by Intel itself [60].
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